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Illinois Supreme Court should
consider reasonable doubt issue

L

ast month, a state appel- have been told, for example, that a
late court reversed the
reasonable doubt is a “fair, actual
CRIMINAL
conviction of Mark
and logical doubt” while simultaneCONVICTIONS
Downs — a gang memously being warned that to be reaber serving 70 years for
sonable, the doubt must not be
the murder of a 6-year-old boy —
“merely speculative or a product of
because the trial court attempted
the imagination.”
to answer a jury question about the
Empirical studies suggest jurors
MARC D.
definition of reasonable doubt.
don’t find such efforts helpful.
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The case marks at least the third
Moreover, many attempts to define
time since 2011 that serious convicreasonable doubt inadvertently end
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tions have been overturned beup lowering the state’s burden of
cause a judge tried to explain the
proof or shifting it to the defendant. at Northern Illinois University College of
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meaning of reasonable doubt to a
Accordingly, Illinois decided long Law.
law and procedure. He can be reached at
jury. Although there was good reaago that “reasonable doubt” should
mfalkoff@niu.edu.
son to reverse the conviction in
speak for itself since efforts to deDowns, the legal premise the appelfine it “usually result merely in an
late court relied on was flawed. At
elaboration of language without any reasonable doubt.
this point, the Illinois Supreme
corresponding amplification of the
When the Downs trial court told
Court should step in and set the
idea.” People v. Johnson (Ill. 1925).
the jurors it was up to them to delower courts straight.
But what then to do with the jufine reasonable doubt for themDowns was convicted in 2009 of
ry’s query in Downs? It was proper
selves, it was offering guidance. By
the first-degree murder of Nico
for the trial court to offer no defdoing so, according to the appellate
Contreras. The chief evidence
inition of reasonable doubt in its
panel, the court violated the absoagainst him came from a fellow
charge to the jury, but didn’t the
lute prohibition on instructions
gang member who described
judge have an obligation to respond about reasonable doubt and comDowns shooting through a wall and
once it became clear the jurors had mitted plain error.
window of a home, trying to kill a
no clear idea what reasonable
It is revealing that the appellate
rival but instead killing the 6-yeardoubt meant?
court was at a loss as to how the
old.
After all, pegging the standard at trial judge should have extricated
As the jurors deliberated, they
somewhere between 60 percent
itself from the “real bind” the jury’s
sent out a note to the court: “What
and 80 percent certainty of guilt is
query created for the court.
is your definition of reasonable
stunningly misguided. Even if reaThe “only acceptable answer
doubt: 80 percent, 70 percent or 60
sonable doubt — a qualitative mea- that we can think of,” the panel ofpercent?”
sure — could be quantified, these
fered in a footnote, “would have
The trial court found itself in a
numbers are way too low.
been to tell the jury that reasonquandary since Illinois law
able doubt is not dedisapproves of providing
fined as a percentage,
jury instructions that
but rather is the highThe case marks at least the third
define reasonable
est standard of proof
time
since
2011
that
serious
convictions
doubt. What, then,
known in law, and
would be the approprihave been overturned because a judge that the jury had all of
ate response to a direct
its instructions needtried to explain the meaning of
query from the jury
ed to answer its quesabout the term?
tion.”
reasonable
doubt
to
a
jury.
To answer that quesBut as the court action, we must first acknowledged, even this
knowledge that the state’s “no defNonetheless, the trial court constatement “would have strayed into
inition” rule is not as confounding
cluded it was not allowed to offer
providing a definition of reasonable
as it might appear. Practice has
any enlightenment to the jury. “We
doubt” and might itself have conshown that it’s notoriously difficult
cannot give you a definition; it is
stituted error.
to capture the essence of reasonyour duty to define it.” The jury
In sum, the appellate court found
able doubt in different words. As
then returned a verdict of guilty.
reversible error on the part of the
Lemuel Shaw observed in 1850, it’s
Was the judge’s response retrial judge but didn’t have a clue
a term “often used, probably pretty
versible error? Yes it was, but not
what the judge should have done inwell understood, but not easily defor the reasons offered by the apstead.
fined.”
pellate court.
Luckily, the dilemma identified
The law reports are filled with
According to the 3rd District
by the appellate court is illusory. It’s
failed attempts at defining reasonAppellate Court panel’s reading of
based on an over-reading of prior
able doubt. At best, trial judges
precedent, Illinois law forbids
case law which establishes nothing
usually end up substituting one
judges from offering juries any
more than the admonition that
opaque phrase for another. Jurors
guidance about the meaning of
judges avoid defining reasonable

doubt because doing so is rarely
helpful.
In Illinois law, there is no absolute prohibition against reasonable
doubt instructions. Nor should
there be.
With the exception of two similarly misguided opinions from appellate courts in the 1st and 2nd districts, in none of the cases cited by
the Downs court was it per se error
for the court to provide a reasonable doubt instruction to the jury.
Even where a proffered definition
was erroneous, reversal was merited only when it was likely that the
jury applied the instruction in an
unconstitutional manner.
Yes, reversal was merited in
Downs, but not because the trial
court should have remained silent
in response to the jury’s question.
Instead, reversal was necessary
because the trial court did not go
far enough in trying to explain reasonable doubt after the jury affirmatively revealed it did not have a
defensible understanding of the
term.
In most cases, attempting to define reasonable doubt will do more
harm than good. But when a judge
learns that the jury’s understanding is flawed and does nothing to
correct it, there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury will apply the
instruction in a manner that violates the Sixth Amendment.
In Downs, therefore, the problem
wasn’t that the judge offered an instruction on reasonable doubt to
the jury; it was that the judge offered an inadequate instruction
that didn’t correct their misunderstanding.
Reversing a murder conviction is
a weighty matter. If appellate panels are going to order new trials,
they should be doing so for the right
legal reasons. But at present, appellate courts from the 1st, 2nd and
3rd districts are mechanically applying the “no definition” rule
based on a misreading of precedent.
Unless the Illinois Supreme
Court steps up to correct the appellate court’s faulty legal reasoning in Downs, the next reversal of a
murder conviction might be for a
trial court error that was no error
at all.
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